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Introduction
This chapter explores the roots and developments of social innovation 
through comparative historical case studies. Specifically, this chapter 
introduces a theoretical and methodological framework for this his-
torical discussion. It then goes on to discuss trends observed from a 
preliminary analysis of several historical cases of social innovation and 
offers a more detailed discussion of one specific case – the emergence of 
the intelligence test. This research contributes findings around three key 
trends and dynamics: how new ideas shift the intellectual landscape and 
create the space for novel combinations; the complimentary and over-
lapping efforts of ‘poets’, ‘debaters’ and ‘designers’ (different roles for 
agents); and the importance of agents functioning at both the niche 
and landscape level. 
This chapter, as part of a larger project based at the Waterloo Institute 
for Social Innovation and Resilience (WISIR), Canada, examines the 
life cycle of a social innovation using historical examples. Throughout 
this chapter, social innovations are defined as new products, pro-
cesses, procedures, policies and designs that seek profoundly to change 
authority and resource flows and eventually tip entire systems towards 
greater resilience and sustainability (Westley, Zimmerman and Patton, 
2006). This cycle begins with the discovery and definition of new 
social phenomena (discrete new values or ideas about society, nature, 
technologies, processes and/or the individual that have credibility and 
legitimacy, with people acting as though they believe them to be true). 
These new social phenomena offer a glimpse of the ‘adjacent possible’ – 
the scope of possible social arrangements one degree removed from 
current realities (Kaufmann, 2000). By doing so, new social phenomena 
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spark wider exploration and provide the opportunity for the creation 
of clusters of inventions and innovations. These innovations can ulti-
mately shift an entire system, potentially moving it to a place of greater 
social resilience and rooting those new social phenomena as core ideas 
in the new iterations of the system in question (Westley et al., 2011). 
Wallerstein (1974) argued truth changes because society changes, but 
this chapter suggests that as new ‘truths’ emerge and compete for domi-
nance, they create the space for society to follow.
Mulgan (2006) pointed to the ‘radical innovation’ origins of much 
of modern life. Although Mulgan saw social innovation as a response 
to modernity’s twin pillars – industrialisation and urbanisation – many 
radical ideas that have changed society emerged long before the 18th 
and 19th century. Some of these are still embedded in society, while 
others have been displaced or abandoned over time. History allows the 
observation of patterns and disruptions across multiple timescales post 
hoc. This type of analysis is the goal of many contemporary studies 
of resilience and complexity (see Van der Leeuw et al., 2011). A well-
constructed historical narrative can provide insights into events and 
trends to a far greater extent than can be done in the moment (Byrne, 
1998, p. 26). 
Berkes and Folke (1998) argued that the characteristics of complex 
systems require a case study-based approach for their analysis. Several 
excellent studies have employed historical cases in their research into 
complex systems (Gunderson et al., 1995; Berkes and Folke, 1998; 
Ommer, 2007; Redman and Foster, 2008; Bures and Kanapaux, 2011). 
Despite the dangers of historicism (imposing the perspective of inevi-
tability on events), history can provide a rich resource for those look-
ing to understand social processes. However, there is an equal risk of 
over-emphasising detail, context and specificity, as there is of imposing 
rigid theory on the messy complexity of human systems. In complex 
systems, information and behaviours do not necessarily scale up; activ-
ity at the micro level does not simply add up to produce outcomes at 
the macro level and one does not necessarily explain the other, hence 
the benefit of conducting multiple cases, with replication in questions 
and design, to allow for cross-case comparison (Yin, 2003). Multiple 
cases of equal and significant depth hopefully allow the researcher to 
differentiate context and phenomena, as individual details must be 
‘always considered within the broader concerns of the overarching 
research question’ (Ommer, 2007, p. 26). 
This chapter is based on research carried out during the initial stages 
of a comparative historical project at WISIR. Since social innovation is 
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defined here as including products as well as deliberative processes 
and policies that are transformative in their outcome with respect to 
building greater social resilience (Westley, Zimmerman and Patton, 
2006), the case selection focused initially on these disruptions and then 
worked backwards. This approach revealed unexpected combinations, 
incredible innovations and sometimes no ultimate innovation at all. 
Cases also focused on those products and processes that sought to shift 
systems towards greater inclusion, greater resilience and greater prosper-
ity, although it became clear that such objectives do not always trans-
late into their desired outcomes. Additionally, wider social changes can 
ultimately cause a great innovation with an admirable social goal to fail. 
Two such examples of failed social innovation are included in the over-
all set of cases analysed. After extensive discussion of possible examples 
of historical social innovations, cases were selected that represented a 
broad spectrum of innovations and disruptions in different domains 
and temporal spaces, including the American national parks system, the 
World Wide Web, financial derivatives, contraception, intelligence test-
ing and the Dutch spice trade. At this early stage of the project, breadth 
was preferred to test the hypothesis in different contexts. 
The research aimed to find out whether there were common mecha-
nisms or trends across disparate disruptive shifts. The first step was to 
identify significant institutional shifts (such as the introduction of a 
new law). Looking at these discrete moments, the goal(s) (rather than 
the results) of these new pieces of legislation or institutional changes 
were explored and the windows of opportunity that made change 
possible were identified. Therein, this research looked for new ideas: 
it considered both the description and discovery of new ideas and the 
convergences of new and existing ideas and trends, and investigated 
whether any of these new ideas constituted a new social phenomenon.
A framework for analysis
Social innovation is of increasing interest in exploring ‘wicked prob-
lems’, limited resources and ingenuity gaps (Rittel, 1972; Westley, 
Zimmerman and Patton, 2006; Bason, 2010; Homer-Dixon, 1995). 
Despite the apparent novelty of social innovation as a construct or set 
of discourses, humans have experimented and achieved disruptive and 
durable social change repeatedly over time. This research suggests that 
social innovation is a common dynamic of human history, although 
the way in which sustainability and resilience are defined at specific 
historical moments is not a constant. This is especially important from 
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an analytical standpoint, as including a range of historical examples 
considerably increases the pool of social innovations that can be stud-
ied, allowing researchers to test multiple theories and look for overarch-
ing patterns and commonalities across cases. The theoretical framework 
employed here to explore historical social innovation is composed of 
three broad elements: the driving force of new (and new combinations 
of) ideas into the adjacent possible, the compilation of different agents’ 
activities within a specific case and the importance of understanding 
the obstacles and opportunities at the niche and landscape level.
New ideas; novel combinations
Combination of two or more existing ideas, theories or products is 
commonly acknowledged as a key driver of technological innovation 
and scientific discovery, and similarly is seen as a key mechanism of 
innovation generally (van den End and Kemp, 1999; Becker et al., 2006; 
Arthur, 2009; Biggs et al., 2010; Thagard, 2012). Arthur (2009) suggested 
new technologies and technological domains emerge as the result of the 
discovery of new naturalistic phenomena, as well as through the com-
bination of existing technologies within and across domains. Similarly, 
looking at 100 scientific discoveries and 100 technological innovations, 
Thagard (2012) sought common features of how individuals involved 
in those breakthroughs had perceived and/or created novelty. Thagard 
credited combinations of mental representations (ideas that combine 
two or more distinct concepts, products, etc.) as the most common, 
compelling explanation for the creative process.
This research considers a social dimension of the combination 
hypothesis of invention. It examines how the emergence of new social 
phenomena – discrete new ideas about society, nature, technolo-
gies, processes and/or the individual – can create the opportunity for 
new perceptions of or re-interpretations of social arrangements and 
of human behaviour, individually or collectively. These new social 
phenomena allow for glimpses of the adjacent possible, the range of 
alternative social arrangements just beyond the horizon of prevailing 
practice (Kauffman, 2000; Johnson, 2010). Translating this glimpse 
into action, agents create new processes, products, programmes and, 
eventually, policies, all or any of which can produce deep shifts in 
complex social systems (this assertion is hypothesised from arguments 
in Arthur (2009), as well as the description of social innovations’ poten-
tial as described in works like Westley, Zimmerman and Patton, 2006). 
The exploration of the adjacent possible is a key dynamic of social 
innovation. 
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This chapter proposes three general categories of social phenomena: 
naturalistic, constructed and technological. Naturalistic phenomena 
are primarily discovered in the realm of science. An example of a new 
and transformative naturalistic phenomenon was the discovery of the 
microbial cause of cholera, which replaced the miasma hypothesis and 
arose from discrete observations strengthened by careful data collec-
tion (Johnson, 2006). For example, Dr John Snow tracked an entire, 
and very deadly, outbreak of cholera in 19th-century London, clearly 
demonstrating that the only common thread between disparate victims 
was a single contaminated water pump. The weight of such evidence 
pushed key thinkers and decision-makers away from believing in bad 
air and towards an understanding of bad microbes as cholera’s cause 
(Johnson, 2006). 
Constructed phenomena are concepts that a discrete group (a cul-
ture, a sect or a political group) believes to be true and that guides their 
behaviour accordingly. These reflect an earlier sociological concept, the 
‘social fact’, namely ideas, rules and beliefs that are real in their effects 
(if not always strictly tangible or falsifiable), and constrain or direct our 
activities (Durkheim, 1912; 1968). 
Technological phenomena consist of both individual technologies 
(e.g., a car or computer or the subsidiary technologies of which they 
are composed) and technology regimes. New technologies can enhance 
people’s ability to engage with the natural world or achieve insights 
into the workings of their own bodies. Similarly, new technologies or 
technology regimes – such as the World Wide Web – can affect how 
societies live and how citizens interact and organise their economies, as 
well as affecting the larger flows of power. The emergence of each type 
of phenomenon can trigger or create space for social innovations that 
can ultimately change an entire social system; a new idea can, thus, lead 
to further opportunities for transformative innovation.
The heterogeneity of agency
The social innovation process is often the result of the interaction 
of agency and institutional dynamics (North, 1990; McCallum et al., 
2009). This chapter’s exploration of historical social innovation further 
distinguishes agents’ behaviour and roles into three categories (adopted 
from Himelfarb, 2013): the ‘poet’, the ‘designer’ and the ‘debater’. These 
are agent ‘roles’ (an agent can transition between roles), and this chap-
ter argues that the success of a disruptive social innovation relies on the 
cooperation or compilation of their efforts at specific moments and over 
time. The poet shapes or expresses the new idea or social phenomenon, 
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the designer converts the phenomenon into an innovation (a policy 
agenda, a programme, a product, etc.) and the debater advocates either 
for the innovation, the new phenomenon, or both. 
The debater is the historical social or systems entrepreneur, who 
champions an innovation through the system, convening different 
stakeholders and interest groups; ‘finding the opportunities to lever-
age innovative ideas for much greater system impact’ (Westley, 2013). 
However, the roles of designer and poet are not directly translatable to 
the existing concepts of the social entrepreneur defined or discussed in 
the business or social change literature (Peredo and McLean, 2006; Mair 
and Marti, 2006; Bornstein, 2007; Gunn and Durkin, 2010; Abu-Saifan, 
2012). Perhaps this is a function of the difference in breadth between 
the concepts. The poet, who first observes and/or describes a new social 
phenomenon, is not necessarily tied to the social innovation or social 
change process. Instead, that role falls on the designer, who sees the 
opportunities created through the adjacent possibles that are opened up 
by the description and specification of this new phenomenon. 
For instance, the early 19th-century romantic artists and explorers 
who first praised the ‘pristine’ and distinctive quality of America’s inte-
rior did not themselves decide that large public parks were the appro-
priate means to protect and share that experience. Their celebration of 
wilderness was the inspiration for the creation of the first national park 
at Yosemite during the American Civil War. It took the combined work 
of men like landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted (a designer who 
wrote a manifesto for parks) and businessman-turned-environmentalist 
John Muir (co-founder of the Sierra Club) to lobby the public and gov-
ernment to create a system of parks open to the entire American popula-
tion. Thus, poets, designers and debaters built on the work of each other 
to create disruptive change. 
Scale
To achieve broad, lasting change, social innovations must cross multi-
ple scales (Westley et al., 2011). Actors can work across scales and can 
influence rules and structures: ‘action is constrained and enabled by 
structure, but through reflexive feedback, structures are also changed 
by agency’ (MacKay and Tambeau, 2013, p. 676). In this research study, 
cross-scale, cross-case comparison initially proved problematic. The 
DRIFT group used a framework consisting of three scales – niche, regime 
and landscape – in their interesting examinations of socio-technical 
transitions (Geels, 2006; Geels and Schot, 2007). However, since the his-
torical cases considered in this study represented highly variant problem 
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domains, geographical domains (regional, national and international) 
and temporal scales, defining a common ‘regime’ or a similar meso-level 
of analysis was difficult. Exploring the landscape (macro) and niche 
(micro) scales, however, proved critical in understanding the ways in 
which ideas open up adjacent possibles. 
The landscape scale comprises the ‘backdrop that sustains society’ 
(Geels and Schot, 2007, p. 403), ranging from the physical environment 
to the ‘political constellations, economic cycles, and broad societal 
trends’ (Westley et al., 2011). Borrowing from the Resilience Alliance’s 
heuristic discussion of resilience, this chapter uses the concept of 
‘basins of attraction’, defined as the factors within a given landscape 
that contribute to the stability of a specific system or set of arrange-
ments (Folke et al., 2004). These are deepened by landscape conditions – 
the collection of resources and the influence of overarching ‘big ideas’ 
(such as democracy, capitalism and scientific progressivism) that 
maintain stable states within that broader landscape. It also identifies 
the importance of historical niches or micro-level sites – protective 
spaces where agents exchange ideas, experiment and explore relative 
possibilities. 
Building on the assertion that a disruptive innovation can trigger the 
transition of a system from one basin of attraction to another, and that 
an institutional or systems entrepreneur can also lower the thresholds 
between proximate basins (Hwang and Christensen, 2008; Westley et al., 
2011), historical examples of this dynamic were sought within the 
cases. The analysis showed how agents were able to travel between the 
niche and landscape level to aid critical transitions and advocate for 
their particular innovation. In the case of the World Wide Web, design-
ers (frequently programmers) often considered what could be done 
technologically (working in research institute niches, for instance), and 
also what should be done. The latter question was a landscape-level 
concern, as designers like Ted Nelson (The Computer Manifesto) sought 
to create an open, egalitarian web, which reflected their political and 
social values broadly. 
Hence, the theoretical framework developed here encompasses both 
the interplay of agency and structure, and the idea that innovation 
and exploration can be both spontaneous and contingent as well as 
deliberate and thoughtful. This analysis sought to understand not just 
the conditions that favour disruptive change but also the behaviours 
that encourage it, and to identify the important actors and milestones 
in the lifecycle of an idea from possibility to innovation to disruption 
to orthodoxy. 
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The intelligence test: an explanatory case study
The creation of the intelligence test was a specific solution to a concern 
about how to arrange people in an emerging modern meritocracy and 
industrial economy, grounded in the growing faith in scientific progres-
sivism to improve society and individuals. The particular scientific – or 
pseudo-scientific – basis for the tests relied on a combination of theories 
of genetic inheritance and Social Darwinism, as well as new scientific 
techniques that facilitated repeatable mass testing. There were two 
‘poets’, Sir Francis Galton (the creator of Social Darwinism) and Alfred 
Binet, who articulated mental capacity as ‘intelligence’. Binet himself 
was also a ‘designer’. He created the first reliable test of children’s 
cognitive abilities, although other designers experimented with the 
potential of testing mental capacity two decades before Binet debuted 
his test in 1911, and continued to refine Binet’s test for years to come. 
Two key ‘debaters’ advanced the idea of testing in America: Henry 
Herbert Goddard, a psychologist who worked with people labelled 
‘feebleminded’, and Robert Yerkes, a psychologist whose chairmanship 
of the National Research Council during the First World War allowed 
him to successfully advocate for testing for all American army recruits. 
Although Goddard and Lewis Terman (another designer in this story) 
began work in their respective laboratory/academic settings, as debaters, 
they were able to see the policy implications of their work and read 
signals of potential landscape shifts as opportunities to advance the use 
of the intelligence test.
New ideas, new combinations and adjacent possibles
Two key new naturalistic phenomena (re)discovered in the 19th cen-
tury had foundational effects on the education and treatment of chil-
dren. The first was Darwin’s description of natural selection, which, he 
argued, ‘works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal 
and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection’ 
(Chitty, 2007, p. 25). The second was the rediscovery of Mendel’s rules 
of genetic inheritance, specifically heredity. 
So emerged an adjacent possible: if features such as eye colour and 
height could be explained by genetic differences, some reasoned the 
same could be said for character, for intelligence and achievement, as 
well as for social problems such as crime and poverty (O’Brien, 2011). 
Darwin’s second cousin, Francis Galton (an example poet for scientific 
progressivism’s ability to improve society, and rank humanity according 
to measurable merit), applied the concept of natural selection to explain 
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social stratification: those who enjoyed the spoils of society were closer 
to ‘perfection’ than their lesser fellows (Chitty, 2007; Dudziak, 1986). 
This ‘Social’ Darwinism mixed scientific and social validation of a class-
based society (inequality of situation and opportunity), combining 
naturalistic and constructed phenomena. This in turn created a new 
adjacent possible: specifically, might heredity and science build a better 
population? These views defined the intellectual niche of Eugenics, the 
so-called ‘science’ of improving the quality of humanity (Chitty, 2007). 
‘Better’ here meant racial purity and was usually seen from a middle- or 
upper-middle-class Protestant perspective, borrowing elements from 
Malthusian and Darwinian theory (Dudziak, 1986; Zenderland, 1998).
Many who were concerned with social improvement in the late 19th 
and early 20th century considered the ‘menace of the feebleminded’ to 
be a significant threat to public safety and social progress (Samelson, 
1987, p. 114). If ‘better’ was possible, so too it must be possible to elimi-
nate society’s least desirable, specifically those labelled ‘feebleminded’. 
According to this view, ‘the feebleminded’ posed a several-pronged 
threat (reflecting in part the confused and flexible definition of ‘feeble-
mindedness’): they were incompetent (and idle), so they did not and 
could not contribute to the productive economy, and collectively and 
individually, they represented a threat to public health and morals as 
they were liable to commit such sins as ‘promiscuity, adultery, incest, 
crime and alcoholism’ (Dudziak, 1986, p. 845; Zenderland, 1998). Thanks 
to the combination of these social views with new understandings of 
the naturalistic phenomenon of inheritance, negative behaviours were 
perceived as the result of bad genes and, therefore, fixed more than 
environmental.
The intelligence test: a social innovation 
The belief that the differences among people, including ability, character 
and intelligence, were measurable and determinate opened up a new 
adjacent possible for educators. Progressives had campaigned for decades 
for technical and scientific expertise in designing, implementing and 
evaluating public policy (Cravens, 1987). Within this broader debate 
about the direction and content of the public realm, the education 
regime in North America and Western Europe was undergoing a fun-
damental pedagogical shift, from philosophy to psychology (Blanton, 
2000; Cravens, 1987). Education had become the state’s purview in 
many Western countries, and education officials sought to take advan-
tage of new scientific quantitative measurements methods effectively 
and definitively to test and stream their student bodies (Chitty, 2007).
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As part of the view that schools were the avenues to change or build 
society, several niches of experimentation presented new innovations 
to scale across the system. As an example, to address the concerns of 
‘feeblemindedness’ in schools, an association of American teachers 
established special education programmes in 1902, where instruction 
would be tailored to the academic limitations or specific needs of a class 
of students (Zenderland, 1998). But to educate the ‘feebleminded’, there 
needed to be an effective, reliable method of sorting the student popu-
lation. Education officials sought to take advantage of the emerging 
statistical study of human populations (a new technological process), 
especially the permanent census (Ramsden, 2003). The ability to collect 
and process large amounts of data about a state’s population informed 
many aspects of the state’s growing responsibilities, including the man-
agement of the classroom. There was competition between different 
types of tests and different assumptions of how hereditary intelligence 
could be measured, but most failed to scale beyond the small niches in 
which they developed (Sokal, 1987). 
In the last decades of the 19th century, psychological laboratories 
emerged in universities. While these laboratories were ideal niches for 
experimentation, they had failed to produce workable, scalable innova-
tions. Charles Spearman – a key poet in the development of intelligence 
testing – lamented the first decades of his discipline as failing to achieve 
its promised impact on such fields as education, or on life more broadly. 
In an artistic flourish, he remarked that the laboratory results had yet to 
bridge the divide between academia and society: ‘the results of all good 
experimental work will live, but as yet most of them are like hieroglyphics 
awaiting their deciphering Rosetta stone’ (Spearman, 1904, p. 204). In this 
1904 treatise (surprisingly replete with such bold illustrations), Spearman 
reported on a correlation he observed: people who did well on one 
form of mental test did well on all forms of mental tests (Bartholomew, 
Allerhand and Deary, 2013). Spearman hypothesised that there existed a 
‘general mental ability’ which he labelled g: ‘Spearman speculated that its 
[g] biological basis was some general aspect of how brains varied between 
people’ (Bartholomew, Allerhand and Deary, 2013, p. 223). 
The most important poet (and designer) in the case of the intelligence 
test was Alfred Binet. He sought a practical way to capture ‘g’ or his 
equivalent: importantly, this test must be ‘a work of administration, 
not a work of science’ (Binet and Simon, 1905, trans. Kite, 1916). Binet 
devised the first reliable test of children’s cognitive capabilities, based on 
the twin assumptions that ability is based on genetic inheritance rather 
than environmental factors and that it can be mapped systematically 
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over time. Binet and his colleague Theodore Simon devised the first 
practical test to distinguish the mentally incapable from those failing 
for environmental rather than genetic reasons (Spearman, 1904; Chitty, 
2007; Zenderland, 1998). Those children whom the test ‘objectively’ 
indicated were ‘feebleminded’ could be institutionalised, a separation 
believed to be in their best interest and as well as the interest of society 
generally (Blanton, 2000, p. 1016).
Scaling towards a tipping point and mass adoption
In this case, one key debater who scaled Binet’s test in the United States 
and who argued for intelligence as a naturalistic phenomenon was 
Henry Herbert Goddard. Goddard was a psychologist and Director of 
Research at the Vineland Training School for Feeble-Minded Girls and 
Boys in New Jersey, a niche that allowed him to experiment with differ-
ent tests. A vociferous advocate for intelligence testing and the role of 
psychology in education, Goddard successfully shifted the narrative of 
‘feeblemindedness’ in America to a question of intelligence (Zenderland, 
1998). Binet had developed his test for the French school system (Binet 
and Simon, 1905, trans. Kite, 1916), and his ideas and practices were 
largely limited to Europe until the spring of 1908 when Goddard, as the 
latter wrote later, ‘made a visit to Europe in the interests of the work [of 
the Vineland Laboratory]’ and ‘learned of the tests’, from a Dr Decroly 
in Brussels, who had recently completed his own tests using the Binet-
Simon method (Goddard, in Binet and Simon, 1905, trans. Kite, 1916, 
p. 5). Goddard advocated for the theory that ‘feeblemindedness’ was the 
result of a lack of intelligence, and that a simple test could differentiate 
these children from the broader class. He was able to convince American 
doctors working in institutions for the ‘feebleminded’ to ‘redefine men-
tal deficiency in terms of intelligence’ (Zenderland, 1998, p. 104). 
At first, the proposed solution to ‘feeblemindedness’ was institutional 
segregation. Advocates believed that a good institution could even train 
the ‘feebleminded’ to ‘go out into the world and support themselves’, 
but that should only be allowed if the ‘feebleminded’ could be steri-
lised to remove ‘the terrible danger of procreation’ (Zenderland, 1998, 
pp. 81–182; Dudziak, 1986). If ‘feeblemindedness’ was inherited, then 
removing any question of genetic transmission could remove the major 
threat the ‘feebleminded’ apparently posed to society.
Disruptions and social shifts 
The intelligence test quickly facilitated another form of social control 
over those deemed ‘feebleminded’, as new medical technology allowed 
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for safe sterilisation. Beginning with Indiana in 1907, twenty-eight 
states introduced compulsory sterilisation laws (although it was not 
until the case of Carrie Buck in 1925 that any of these laws were upheld 
at the state supreme court level) (Dudziak, 1986). Mass testing was also 
used to ‘validate’ assumptions about the hierarchy of races. Binet explic-
itly did not want his test to be used to rank people, beyond separating 
those who fell below a certain level and could benefit little from con-
ventional education (Blanton, 2000). Once the process was available, 
however, it was quickly seized on by others who aimed to differentiate 
people based on intelligence and race. 
Lewis Terman expanded the scale of Binet’s test to a wider range of 
age categories, including adults in 1916, which facilitated the work 
of Robert Yerkes, another key debater in the adoption of the intelli-
gence test. Like Goddard, Yerkes was an American psychologist. Yerkes 
believed science could validate and inform a merit-based hierarchy of 
people based on their ability and potential contribution to the economy 
(Kevles, 1968). Yerkes was the Chairman of the National Research 
Council in the United States, a position that put him in direct contact 
with key powerful individuals within the American military. 
America joined the Allies in the First World War in 1917, and needed 
to raise a large (mainly civilian) army quickly. Yerkes saw this as an 
opportunity for psychology generally and intelligence tests specifically 
to demonstrate their utility in evaluating human potential rapidly 
and efficiently. He convinced the Surgeon General of the Army of the 
potential of testing its new recruits as the country quickly expanded 
its forces for combat in France (Kevles, 1968). Half a million men 
underwent the test. Although this process was not without problems1 
(Blanton, 2000; Pinter, 1926), tests on this massive scale were seen to 
validate both the test and the concept behind it – intelligence. In 1919, 
the Lancet declared, ‘Intelligence, of course, is only one of the factors 
in military efficiency, but it is probably the most important single 
factor’, and that, thanks to the war, intelligence tests had given ‘clear 
indications of their future value in the work of human selection and 
vocational training’ (p. 539). 
The rush of tests during the war may not have resulted in many 
privates being raised to officers, as Terman and others had argued they 
would. However, the war did allow the test to scale out from niche 
laboratories very quickly, reflecting the Lancet’s confidence that the test 
would change vocational training. The war was a proof of process, that 
testing could be done on a mass scale, and produce results in which the 
testers had confidence. As a result, schools increasingly adopted the tests 
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(Watson, 1953; Blanton, 2000). Simultaneously, Goddard introduced 
internships for consulting psychologists at his Vineland school, further 
reinforcing the tests’ role in psychology as new entrants were trained at 
this centre of Binet-based testing (Watson, 1953). 
The link between Eugenics and race was central to the perverse logics 
of Nazi Germany, but it is hardly the only example. One particularly 
well-documented example was the mass I.Q. testing that the state edu-
cational establishment of Texas used to affirm their belief in a hierarchy 
of racial intelligence (Blanton, 2000). The testers wanted to find dif-
ferences between Caucasian, Hispanic and African American children. 
When the results strongly pointed to an urban–rural divid e instead, 
they hypothesised (and then concluded) that this reflected a difference 
in the children’s skin tone – something for which the children were 
never tested (Blanton, 2000). Chitty (2007) has argued that the link 
between fixed intelligence and class was reflected in the ongoing dif-
ferentiation of academic and vocational education that began in the 
late 19th century: ‘we need to educate the middle class but merely to 
train the working class’. Although credible accusations of racism and 
classism remain, nevertheless tests of intellectual capacity opened up 
educational opportunities for lower-income children, beginning in the 
1950s (Blanton, 2000).
Conclusion
Given much of the current interest, verging on excitement, surrounding 
social innovation, it is an ever-present risk that the concept becomes 
a normative label for the products, processes and procedures that are 
valued today – such that novelty is inherently seen as better than past 
arrangements and ideas. History is rich with examples of such hubris 
and, although it is a useless (and often inaccurate) truism to say history 
repeats itself, this chapter suggests that the study of social innovation is 
richer for a consideration of historical examples, especially when those 
examples reflect both on the process of change but also its risks. This 
is not to recommend a paralysis among social entrepreneurs – not all 
social innovations are the equivalent of the intelligence test – but to 
support the acknowledgement of actors’ part in complex systems. Social 
innovation is not a process through which to achieve a Whiggish ideal 
future but rather an ongoing re-evaluation and exploration of systems 
as needs and values change. 
The story of the intelligence test is not a celebratory one, but it was 
certainly an attempt better to serve the marginalised (in this case ‘serve’ 
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must be interpreted through the cultural lens of the time) and to build 
a more resilient society through scientific–social partnerships. The big 
ideas of scientific progressivism created opportunities for innovation: 
concepts of intelligence generated the possibility of a test for ability 
and theories of inheritance, for sterilisation based on the tests. Poets 
created and described this opening to the adjacent possible, designers 
created tests that could bring the current reality into line with that future 
and debaters made the necessary connections (political, medical and 
institutional/educational) to bring the intelligence test from its niche 
in laboratories and small-scale schools to become a key element of the 
meritocracy in pre-war America. 
The history of social innovation offers a glimpse of process, of 
agency and of perspective: indeed, of the entire lifecycle of the inno-
vation process. As an example of WISIR’s ongoing research project 
into social innovation, the intelligence test highlights the importance 
of landscape-level events, particularly the World Wars, as massively 
disruptive, creating multiple, and sometimes surprising, windows 
of opportunity for agents like Yerkes who can align their networks 
and campaign for their particular project or product. Additionally, 
the emergent professional and educational bodies important in the 
story of the intelligence test appear increasingly relevant in many of 
the research cases, especially those in the increasingly merit-based 
20th and 21st century. Individual innovations aside – and these can 
be systems shifting too – it is the dynamics of the social, economic 
and political systems that emerge so powerfully in historical cases 
and, when stripped of specific context, offer great potential to inform 
current study of social innovation as an increasingly important and 
self-conscious phenomenon. 
Note
1. Terman’s results reflected his own racial assumptions and tested individuals’ 
level of education rather than their capability. His views were also clearly 
demonstrated in his hope to reduce the number of children born to non-
white Americans.
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